Northrop: European Union and United States Foreign Policy. A Study in Sociological Jurisprudence by Friedmann, W.
REVIEWS
EUROPEAN UNION AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
In his tireless search for common norms and institutions which could bring
together East and West and overcome other schisms dividing contemporary
humanity, Professor Northrop has investigated the problem of European
Union in relation to the foreign policy of the United States. This short book
really falls into two quite separate parts. A considerable portion is devoted
to a courageous criticism of United States foreign policy towards Europe.
It shows a sympathetic understanding both of the magnitude of the efforts,
and of the problems which the countries of Western Europe meet in trying
to overcome their age-old differences. Although in this criticism of American
foreign policy and this account of European doubts and anxieties about it
there is little which has not been said time and again in The Economist, The
New York Times, The Manchester Guardian, and other outstanding English
or American periodicals, it is valuable that a detached scholar of Professor
Northrop's standing should restate the position. As a survey of the problems
of United States-European relations, this little study is a timely and worth-
while contribution.
But Professor Northrop is more ambitious. He submits his book as "a
study in sociological jurisprudence," and he underlines the significance of the
subtitle in the preface. His objective is nothing less than to prove that the
common legal institutions, which a number of European Powers have already
formed or are trying to form, are supported by what Professor Northrop,
following Eugen Ehrlich, calls "the living-law."' Ehrlich defined "living-law"
as "the inner order of society" and contrasted it in some respects with positive
law. Professor Northrop, therefore, sets out to examine the extent to which
the "positive law," e.g., such institutions as the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity, the Council of Europe, and the since defunct European Defense
Community, is supported by the "living-law" of the participating nations.
Doubts concerning the way in which Professor Northrop answers this very
complex and difficult question begin when one is promised in Chapter Six
an analysis of "the living-law of Greater Europe" (in ten pages) and in the
following chapter, an analysis of "the living-law of each continental European
nation" (in twenty-eight pages). A study of these and other chapters shows
that what Professor Northrop calls "an experiment in sociological jurispru-
dence" is little more than an extremely cursory analysis of the major political
parties in Vestern European nations, their party programs, and their electoral
strength according to recent election statistics. This is supplemented by some
figures about the relative distribution of Catholicism and Protestantism. In-
sofar as this is an analysis of contemporary political trends in the nations of
Europe, with brief sketches of some of the leaders, such as Adenauer and
1. To Professor Northrop, in this as in other writings, Ehrlich is "the sociologist of
law," very much as Aristotle wmas "the philosopher" to the medievalists. Vith all respect
to the significance of Ehrlich's contribution, such pioneers of sociological jurisprudence
as Ma-x Weber or Karl Renner on the Continent, Bryce, Dicey, and Maitland in England,
or a number of contemporary American jurists, many of them inspired by Pound, have
contributed as much or more to the study of sociological jurisprudence as Ehrlich.
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Monnet, there is nothing in these pages which is not done week by week
by the able correspondents of the previously mentioned periodicals. But they
do not affix the label of "living-law" to their analysis. The reviewer doubts
whether there is a single instance in Professor Northrop's book where the omis-
sion of the prefix "living-law" would have meant any loss of meaningfulness.-
Professor Northrop uses election figures, party programs, and religious
statistics to demonstrate how far the major parties and groupings of the
nations concerned are likely to support European supranational organizations.
A characteristic example is his analysis of the party program of the Nether-
lands' Labour Party. From the fact that the party's aims include "a legal
order of labour" and "the establishment and vigorous maintenance of the law,
to which the state itself must also submit,"3 Professor Northrop deduces that
here is a characteristic demonstration of the "Stoic Roman, Continental type
of legal mentality, reinforced by the Continental Rationalistic, modern philo-
sophic outlook . . . . 4 This, he further argues, makes supranational sover-
eignty natural. By way of further support, there is a brief excursion into the
philosophy of Europe:
"The Stoic Roman, Continental type of legal mentality and the Con-
tinental Rationalistic philosophical mentality are not artificial or tran-
sitory. They are living-law beliefs built into the minds and emotions
of Continental Europeans by centuries of reflection and education.
Moreover, initiated by Descartes and Malebranche in France, ad-
vanced by Spinoza in the Netherlands and completed by Leibniz and
Kant in Germany, they are living-law norms holding as much for
Belgians, Luxembourgers, Frenchmen, Italians, and even West Ger-
mans as they do for the people of the Netherlands. Similarly, the
domestic norms peculiar to the socialist parties of the six nations are
the same in all six and are, therefore, also supranational, rather than
chauvinistically national in their qualitative content."'
This is a remarkable oversimplification of a problem which many great
political and legal philosophers have discussed for countless years. In the
whole book there is not a single mention of Hegel and neo-Hegelian thought
which, together with Nietzsche, Bergson, and other anti-rationalistic influences,
have had, without question, far stronger impact, in particular on German and
Italian political developments than the ideas which Professor Northrop men-
tions. Hegelian ideas have led to the worship of state power and positive
law, to leader cults, and ultimately to the Nazi and Fascist states. While
counter-influences have asserted themselves more strongly since the downfall
of Hitler's and Mussolini's empires, it would be very rash indeed to assert
that the power of Hegelian ideas has exhausted itself.
2. See, among many other examples: "a purely continental European common living-







No less questionable is the assertion that espousal of a government of
laws in a party program is proof of a "Stoic Roman, Continental legal men-
tality," which in turn demonstrates the strength of European support for such
institutions as the European Coal and Steel Community.0 As purveyors of
high-sounding platitudes, party programs are rivalled only by preambles to
constitutions and international treaties. If protestation of the rule of la%,, in
documents of this kind is taken at its face value, then the signatories to the
Atlantic Charter, the North Atlantic Treaty, the United Nations Charter, and
certainly the American Constitution are as representative of a "Stoic Roman,
Continental" mentality as the West Europeans.
Few if any sociologists of international law and international relations would,
however, accept Professor Northrop's identification of part), programs, and
even election statistics, with the "living-law." A great many of the Germans
who supported Dr. Adenauer's government in 1953, for example, are a floating
element who, in more recent elections, have changed their allegiance. It is a
great illusion, though one shared by many others, that everybody who voted
for Adenauer in 1953 was a supporter of European Community. Again, since
Professor Northrop's book went to press, France has rejected EDC for the
rather different scheme of the London Agreement. Does this mean that the
"living-law" of France and Germany has changed in the last few months? Or
does it not rather mean that basic ideas are only one element in the medley
of ideals, economic interests, emotions, personal power politics, and a multitude
of other factors which makes up the complex pattern of international relations?
It is equally dangerous to assert that official registration of a person's re-
ligious faith determines his political actions. The influence of religious belief
on political faith is probably stronger with Catholics or Moslems than with
Protestants. But these are very difficult matters to dispose of in a few pages.
Like many other Americans, Professor Northrop is a very strong supporter
of the European Defense Community which, at his writing, was still an open
issue, though it is now defunct. His account of the main provisions of that
Treaty is unfortunately much too summary and, in certain respects, incorrect.
It is a common illusion that EDC would have been an exact parallel to the
Coal and Steel Community. It was designed on parallel lines but, as a result
of many compromises, the powers of the Commissariat would have been far
weaker than those of the High Authority at Luxembourg, and subject to a
far greater extent to the consent of the Council of Ministers, i.e., to the
national policies of the participating governments. One wonders how far
Professor Northrop would regard his analysis as confirmed or disproved
by the developments of the last few months?
On examination, many of Professor Northrop's sweeping assertions turn
out to be only half-truths: He states that Protestant nations, unlike Catholic
nations, are not disposed to accept supranational sovereignty, and that British
politics do not favor any closer association with Europe. Under the pressure
of political events, Britain, a Protestant nation, has gone a considerable way
6. P. 88.
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towards supranational organization by accepting the majority decision of
the enlarged Council of the Brussels Pact in regard to her continental defense
forces. Another assumption by Professor Northrop is that nations with
common institutions, religious or cultural, do not go to war with each other,
but are prepared to merge their sovereignties in common institutions. A
common religion or similar political institutions may eliminate conflicts, and
they probably are an essential basis for certain types of international institu-
tions, though not for all international agreements.7 But history has time and
again disproved the thesis that a community of religion or other beliefs may
make wars impossible, for example, between Catholic French and Catholic
Germans, or between Protestant Dutch and Protestant English. From Pro-
fessor Northrop's assumption follows his remarkable definition of aggression:
"Aggression is any violation by one nation of the pluralistic principle
of living-law sovereignty with respect to another nation. This occurs
when any nation tries to impose the norms of its own positive-law
ideology or living law upon the different living-law norms and
positive-law majority choices on another nation."
'8
Does this definition imply that an aggression carried out simply for the pur-
pose of territorial conquest or economic exploitation, or for strategic reasons,
without any change of "living-law norms," is not aggression? The majority of
aggressions have been of this type. How one would wish that the definition of
aggression, on which countless international law commissions have labored
for many years,9 would be as simple as Professor Northrop believes it.
As this little book professes to be a sociology of jurisprudence and interna-
tional law, this reviewer must also record his regret at the completeness with
which Professor Northrop ignores the many serious efforts made in this field
by international lawyers and jurists. As early as 1910, Max Huber sketched
out a program for a sociology of international law. Since then, such distin-
guished scholars as Quincy Wright, Corbett, Morgenthau, McDougal and
Lasswell in the United States, and Schwarzenberger and Stone in the British
Commonwealth have done much to clarify at least parts of this infinitely
complex science. They have discussed some of the conditions in which interna-
tional law demands a closer community of values and interests, and distin-
guished them from other situations where international law can be based
on a looser "society" of nations. How far tentative supranational institutions
established by some European nations will be able to support themselves on
the laws and customs of the participatingnations is indeed a formidable and
important question. It may be useful to sketch out very briefly the kind of
7. For a discussion of this problem, see the reviewer's article: Friedmann, The Dis-
integration of European Civilization and the Future of International Law, 2 MOD. L. R~v.
194 (1938).
8. P. 205.
9. See, e.g., the Report of the U.N. Secretary-General, Document A/2211 (Oct. 3,
1952), on definitions of aggression. This document covers sixty closely printed pages.
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problem that arises, for example, in the European Coal and Steel Community,
the one European supranational authority which is already operating. One
of these problems is how successfully industries with different types of legal
and social organization can be brought under a joint supranational control.
The French coal industry is nationalized; the German industry is not. The
latter, therefore, objects to the attempts of the High Authority, in accordance
with the Treaty, to destroy existing cartels and other restrictive agreements.
Connected with this is the further question of whether the "living-law" of the
participating nations-or to put it more soberly, their economic interests, legal
institutions, social habits, and similar factors-will implement what is one of
the Steel Community's principal objectives: the restoration of international
free competition. To answer this would require a very thorough study of the
legal, structural, and governmental developments of at least half a century in
Germany, France, and other countries.
As already observed, a study of the political and moral philosophies in
Europe would require a very much more balanced and thorough analysis
than Professor Northrop has given. Particularly needed are an assessment
of the respective strength of rationalist and irrationalist, of cosmopolitan and
nationalist tendencies, all of which still struggle with each other. This philo-
sophic analysis must, however, be supported by a multitude of comparisons of
economic and social factors, matters of patient study which, in many cases,
require the collaboration of lawyers, philosophers, economists, sociologists, and
others.
To such a study, Professor Northrop's little book can at most serve as pro-
legomena. And yet, its basic approach to international relations is wise and
courageous. It is a plea for international understanding and organization
through mutual respect for national cultures and traditions rather than
through a giant process of mechanical legal organization. But the implications
of this approach-developed in the author's brilliant and imaginative The Meet-
ing of East and West-are far more complex than Professor Northrop appears
willing to admit.
This reviewer cannot forbear from concluding with a previously voiced
lament: Are contemporary jurists helping to prepare the advent of 19S4 by
the use of high-sounding labels? Among them, "living-law" is still relatively
modest. We hear of "nomology," "integrative jurisprudence," "psychological
jurisprudence," "egological jurisprudence," and even "jurimetrics." Mostly
these are big words for modest thoughts. The men who still tower above
us, who blazed the trail for generations to come, men like Dicey and Mait-
land, like Holmes and Cardozo, like G~ny or Radbruch, did not use labels.
They were not absorbed in methodology. They simply had scholarship, vision
and thought, and with it all, the humility which knows that the solution of
human, social, and legal problems is not a matter of sweeping formulas.
W. FRmmEDNN t
,Professor of Law, University of Toronto School of Law.
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